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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

)

KEITH E. SOHM,

(

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
WENDELL D. WINEGAR , d ba
UTAH ELECTRIC & MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.

!

CASE NO. 14654

)
(
)
(

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff in this action is an attorney duly licensed
to practice law in the courts of this state.

The defendant, Wendell D.

Winegar, is an individual doing business as Utah Electric and Motor Co.,
a business which involves the sale and repair of electric motors and
related supplies.

The plaintiff has been performing legal services for

defendant for about 20 years, during all of which time the parties were
personal friends and they performed services for each other on a very
informal basis (R.95).

No formal written attorney retainer agreement

was ever drawn up between the parties (R. 116) but traditionally throughout
their association the plaintiff had charged and defendant had paid onefourth of the recovery in collection cases except that it may have been
one-half in small collections. (R. 60, 107).

Plaintiff obtained a

judgement for $9,706 against All Grain for defendant and received attorneys
based on one-fourth from February 24, 1973 until October 4, 1973 at about
which time defendant by-passed the plaintiff, settled directly with All
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on attorneys fees,

Defendant also failed to pay attorney's fees on the

Rothe Estate matter and a small balance due in the Flint and Walling Case,
After October, 1973 and throughout 1974 the defendant failed
to respond to the billings of the plaintiff - he never refused to pay, he
just wouldn't respond (Exhibit 14-P).

The plaintiff claims the following

amounts are reasonable and are due on the following accounts with defendant
including interest to May 10, 1976, (Exhibit 1-P), to wits
First Cause of Action - Taylor, All Grain and G.E. acct. $624,26
Second Cause of Action - Rothe Estate Account . .
474.07
Third Cause of Action - Flint and Walling Account
56 .oo
•
TOTAL DUE
$1 1I'3II:93
DISPOSITION BY THE COURT
The lower court denied recovery by the plaintiff on any of the
three causes of action finding that the plaintiff had received a reasonable
fee for his services.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks to have the order of the lower courts
reversed, to find that there was, in fact, a fee arrangement of one-fourth
of the recovery in effect between the parties and that for the sum of
$1,154.93 plus costs and interest, the plaintiff is entitled to judgement.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
First Cause of Action:

The plaintiff, at the request of

defendant and after preliminary demands filed an action in the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, known as Utah Electric and Motor Co.
vs, Lawrence C, Taylor and All Grain Co,, Civil No. 205125.

After

participating in some preliminary motions which were won by plaintiff for
Utah Electric, the plaintiff moved for a Summary Judgement against All
Grain Co, and the Judgement was granted December 21, 1972 in total amount
of $9,706.36 plus costs (R. 58, Ex. 2-P).

Because the corporation refused
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Mr. Taylor

-3personally.

When the trial date of February 27, 1973 drew near (Exhibit 17-P)

plaintiff so advised Mr. Winegar by his notes of December 21, 1972 and
February 16, 1973 (Exhibit 3-P) and urged Taylor and All Grain to Settle,

Mr. Taylor and All Grain agreed to pay the judgement at the rate of $1,000
per month (R. 58) so trial was deferred and All Grain started making payments
February 24, 1973 on a total amount including interest of $9,868,06,
Plaintiff received the monthly payments, computed the interest, distributed
the funds and sent a copy of his accounting to the defendant and the All
Grain attorney each time payment was received (R, 58, 59) (Exhibit 2-P,
p-4).

Checks were received and disbursed (without showing cents) as follows:
Payment

2-24-73
3-24-73
4-26-73
6-20-73
8-15-73
9-o6-73
10-4-73

$1,000
1,000
1,000
2,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
$8,000

To
Keith

To
Wen

Interest

1,000
1,000
1,750

$130
51
52
93

$1,000
250

250

750
1,000

500

500

$2,000

$6,000

50
20
21

Principal
$870
942
947
1,906
949
979
979
BALANCE DUE

Balance
$9,868
8,868
7,925
6,978
4,121
3,142
2,163
$2,163

The defendant acknowledged in this answer (Exhibit 2-P p, 3,4, & 5)
that he received $6,000 and plaintiff received $2,000 up to October 4, 1973
and thereafter defendant received$1,958 (R. 10).
No chamges were assessed by plaintiff for collecting, accounting
and mailing services,
of each $1,000 payment.

Up to October, 1973 plaintiff had received one-fourth
The first $1,000 was held out by plaintiff and

plaintiff held out $500 from the last payment,

The defendant paid $250 in

June and $250 in August in response to billings.
The defendant gave his permission for plaintiff to keep the first
check (R. 101) (Exhibit 2-P).

The defendant was anxious to get the rest of his

money and began calling All Grain and making demands and finally without
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and collected the $1,958 directly from the All Grain people on about
October 18, 1973 (R. 10, 59, 60).

The first time plaintiff knew of the

settlement was when All Grain attorney asked for a satisfaction of
judgement (R. 60 Ex. 2-P p. 2).
one-fourth of $1,958 or $489.50

Plaintiff repeatedly billed defendant for

(Ex. 2-P, 3-P and 4-P). In one instance

April 17, 1974 plaintiff billed defendant for one-third
corrected it later.

By letter of August 9, 1974

(Ex. 3-P p. 5) but

(Ex. 2-P p. 8) Winegar's

secretary wrote obviously objecting to the one-third but no objection was ever
made to the billing for one-fourth until an answer was filed to this complaint, ,
The defendant refused to answer plaintiff's billing, telephone
calls and even evaded plaintiff when he came to his office but the defendant
never once objected to plaintiff's bills and never paid it (R. 60, 62, 63).

(Ex 1-P) since defendant

Plaintiff is now claiming one-fourth of $2,163.00

refused to pay the lesser amount and since he by-passed his attorney in settling\
and did so without plaintiff's permission.
The Second Cause of Action involves the bill of the plaintiff in
the matter of the Rothe Estate,

On or about February 19, 1975, plaintiff

received an offer to settle defendant's claim against the Kurt P. Rothe estate

i

in Wasatch County which claim plaintiff had filed and handled for the defendant !
some 13 years before.

After interviews, research and preparation and two or

I

three appearances arguing motions in the Wasatch County Probate Court, no
recovery was made,

The Court appearances and negotiations covered a period

between October 29, 1962 and July 27, 1964.

The Court appearances were

October 29, 1962, December 13, 1962 and July 27, 1964 (Ex. 4-P).

The plaintiff
1

received about $50.00 for his services (R. 81).

By notice

was advised the Estate would settle for $1,780.57.

(Ex. 5-P) plaintiff

Plaintiff personally

advised the defendant who accepted the settlement offer.

The acceptance was
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-5plaintiff April 17, 1975 made out to Wendell D. Winegar (Ex. 4-P).
of the difficulty in

~etting

Because

his fees in the All Grain case, plaintiff added

his name to the check and left it with defendant rather than holding it
until defendant signed it.

The $1,780,57 represented an unexpected windfall

since both plaintiff and defendant had written the debt off years before
(R. 86).

Plaintiff billed defendant for his usual one-fourth fee by his

bill of April 28, 1975 (Ex. 4-P).

Defendant ignored the bill, failed to

pay it but did not object to it at anytime,
The Third Cause of Action involves the bill of the plaintiff for
$50,00 in the Flint and Walling Case where defendant was sued as a defendant
so charges were based on an hourly rate,

The last check received by the

plaintiff from the defendant for services in this case was for $455.00
(Ex. 6-P and 11-D) which paid plaintiff up to the time a settlement was
entered into on the case on about May 10, 1973.

The additional $50 charge

resulted from further negotiations and letters with Flint and Walling when
defendant failed to make payments to Flint and Walling as agreed.

The

$50 represents a very conservative two hours even though prior billing had
been Oilled $35 an hour (Exhibit 6-P).

The last services were performed

in July and August 1974 (R. 65, 66 Exhibit 6-P).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRORED IN NOT ALLOWING PLAINTIFF ATI'ORNEY'S FEES ON THE
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE-FOURTH OF THE TOTAL
RECOVERED FROM THE JUDGEMENT OBTAINED BY PLAINTIFF FOR DEFENDANT AGAINST
ALL GRAIN COMPANY.
As evidence that plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fee of
one-fourth of the amount of the judgement the plaintiff claims as follows:
1,

The plaintiff performed services for the defendant for many

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-6one-fourth of recovery in collection cases (R. 62, 64). (Many attorneys,
of course, charge one-third or more).
2.

In plaintiff's letter of August 21, 1972 he offered to

work for an hourly fee or for a fee of one-third and asked defendant to
respond but no answer was received (R. 61, Ex. 3-P p. 1).

Plaintiff's next

letter dated December 21, 1972 stated, "I will pursue the matter on a
contingent basis with a minimum as suggested in one of my previous letters"
(R. 61, Ex. 3-P p. 2).

On February 16, 1973, plaintiff advised defendant,

"I will figure attorney's fees on a contingent basis in the Taylor matter."
(Ex 8-d).

PROPOSALS.

NO OBJEI:TION WAS MADE BY DEFENDANT TO THESE CONTINGENT FEE
Based on these pre-recovery proposals plaintiff could have

a one-third fee but decided one-fourth was adequate.

charg~

It is obvious that

defendant never responded or plaintiff would not have kept sending notes,
3.

Plaintiff commenced collection of the judgement on February 24,

1973 and continued to collect for defendant at the rate of $1,000 per month
through October 4, 1973 withholding his one-fourth fee in some cases but
remitting the check and billing in other cases (Ex. 2-P) (Ex. 3-P p. 4).
The defendant paid one $250 bill in June and another one-fourth fee with hls
check No. 1151 dated August 15, 1973 (Ex. 13-D) showing his agreement to the
one-fourth fee terms.

~

plaintiff collected his $250 fee from February

through October WITHOUT AN OBJECTION FROM THE DEFENDANT.

In fact, defendant

never objected to the fee arrangement until he answered the complaint in
June, 1975.
4.

Defendant acknowledged the one-fourth fee arrangement when

he stated in his answer to the Complaint: "4, Pursuant to the a=angement for
payment, the plaintiff received a check on or about February 24, 1973, and
deducted from the $1,000 received $250.00," (R. 10).
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only when

-7he improperly settled directly with the All Grain people, by-passed plaintiff
(his attorney) collected the last payment and conveniently forgot his attorney
(R. 59).
6.

On two instances, November, 1973 and April, 1974, the plaintiff

by error, billed the defendant for one-third

(Ex.

3-P, 9-D, 10-D),

The

defendant's office girl answered one of these billings by letter of
August 9, 1974 "per All Grain Matter.

Your amount is incorrect"

(Ex.

p. 3) but never objected to the billings for one-fourth fee (R. 62).

2-P
This

office letter was the closestdefendant ever came to objecting to anything.
Defendant could not have been very angry at plaintiff as of August 9, 1974
because he requested further services.
7.

When defendant continued to ignore plaintiff for over a year,

plaintiff did everything possible, phoning, writing and even going to
defendant's place of business trying to collect or get some explanation from

Mr. Winegar but Winegar refused to answer calls and even
lie for him (R. 62, 63).

(Ex.

had his office

Even after his office's letter of August 9, 1974

2-P) saying Winegar wanted to discuss with me the defendant refused to

contact me or answer my calls.

Plaintiff's frustration is shown by his

letter of May 12, 1975 demanding some kind of response from defendant to
no avail

(Ex.

14-P).

OBVIOUSLY UP TO MAY 12, 1975 DEFENDANT STILL HAD NOT

OBJECTED TO THE ONE-FOURTH FEE, it wasn't until after that last desperate
letter went unanswered that an action was filed by the plaintiff.
On cross examination defendant stated:
Mr. Sohm:

Q,

"And you never did object to the fee I had put
on those bills of one-fourth, did you?"

Mr. Winegar: A,

"I don't believe that is a fair question."

OBVIOUSLY THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT OR, AT LEAST, DEFENDANT IS
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING HE WAS OBLIGATED TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED ON
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-8not get good collection service (R, 10) but by that time the fee was
already earned and often attorney's charge extra for collecting which
plaintiff did not expect to do,

Anyhow, plaintiff could never understand

defendants impatience since checks came in regularly February, March, April
etc,
POINT II
PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE A'ITORNEY' S FEE BASED ON THE BALANCE DUE - ONE-FOURTH
OF $2,163,00 OR $540,80 AND NOT ON THE AMOUNT OF $1,958.00 REJ::EIVED BY
DEFENDANT SINCE IT WAS AN IMPROPER SE'ITLEMENT AND PLAINTIFF REJ::EIVED ONLY IV'c•
rvor $2,500 AS LATER CLAIMED BY DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff had collected regularly and reasonably on schedule
and a balance of $2,163 was due from All Grain to plaintiff and defendant
(Ex. 2-P p. 5) when defendant improperly and without permission of plaintiff
settled for $1,958 and collected that sum directly from All Grain with
intent of beating plaintiff out of his fees,
The defendant admitted plaintiff had received only $2,000 in his
answer (R, 10) but at trial to the complete surprise of plaintiff came up for
the first time with a claim he had paid plaintiff $2,500 and offered
Exhibit 13-D which plaintiff objected to (R. 9) and testified he had not
received $1,000 on August 9th,

The August 9th entry has been obviously

erased and changed, the last total entry in that column has also been erased
The proper entry on the August 9th line should be $250 or possible $500, nof
$1,000,

The August 9th entry is obviously the check No, 1151 dated

August 15, 1973 at the bottom of Exhibit 13-D (R, 91),

This was the only

payment made by defendant to plaintiff and was made in response to plaintiff
bill June 20, 1973 (Ex, 3-P p. 4),

No checks were produced and a so-called

check 1395 dated 12-9-73 for $200 was denied, and obviously has nothing to
do with this proceeding.

A $100 payment received by plaintiff shown in

Exhibit 7-D was applied to services in the General Electric matter referred
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-9in the record p, 77 and p. 117.

That $100 was the only fee received in the

G. E. matter.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRORED IN NOT ALLOWING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS FEES ON
THE SEX:OND CAUSE OF ACTION. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWS PLAINTIFF IS
ENTITLED TO ONE-FOURTH OF THE SUM OF $1,780,57 ( $445,14) FOR ATTORNEY • S
FEES IN ROTHE ESTATE COLLEX:TION,
About 13 years ago plaintiff represented defendant in filing
a claim against the Estate of Kurt P. Rothe in Wasatch County, (R. 63, Ex.
2-P and 4-P),

The plaintiff made at least two or three appearances in

Heber City on the matter over a couple of years period (Ex, 4-P).
plaintiff and defendant had given up and written the claim off,

Both
In February

1975 plaintiff received a notice (Ex, 5-P) offering defendant 80% or
$1,780,57 to settle his claims.
agreed to the settlement (R, 64),

Plaintiff contacted defendant and defendant
Attorney's fees were not discussed but

plaintiff received the checks (Ex, 4-P) added his name to i t because of his
difficulty recovering other fees and delivered the check to defendant and
billed the defendant for $445.14 (R. 64, Ex. 4-P),

The plaintiff is

entitled to attorney's fees based on one-fourth of the recovery because of
the past practices between the parties of using one-fourth as the attorney's
fee in collection matters as observed by the court, "He is going on the
basis, I assume, that his regular fee had been one-fourth of what he
collected, on this basis,"

(R, 63).

In past practices charges were based

on one-fourth of the recovery as attorneys fees (R, 60),

It was also the

fee that had applied in the All Grain case without objection (R. 62) as
discussed above,

The defendant was billed April 28, 1975 for the sum of

$445.14 (Ex. 4-P) right after the check for $1,780,57 was delivered by
plaintiff to defendant,

No payment was made by defendant and no objection

was
ever received to the billing charge of one-fourth of the recovery despite
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-10repeated demands by plaintiff.

That no objections were received to the

billing is shown by the des-pa.ration letter of plaintiff dated May 12, 1975
(Ex. 14-P).
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRORED IN NOT ALLOWING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEE OF $50.00 IN
THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE FLINT AND WALLING MATTER. THE UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWS THE PLAINTIFF PERFORMED ADDITIONAL SERVICES FOR
DEFENDANT FOR OVER TWO HOURS REASONABLY WORTH $50.00.
The plaintiff was paid a check for $455.00 for his services as

shown on the page of Exhi b1 t 6-P and page two of that exhibit shows two hours
additional services billed as $50 (Ex. 4-P) which was never paid (R. 65).
The services were made necessary when defendant failed to pay Flint and
Walling as agreed.
try

Winegar was trying to stall for time and asked me to

to stall them off (R. 67, 68).

I wrote to defendant August 7, 1974

enclosing a statement and an affidavit regarding default in the Flint and
Walling Matter (Ex. 2-P p. 8).

Defendant's office girl wrote back August 9,

1974 stating:
"With regard to the letter from Mr. Greenwood informing
us that arrangements are to be made to pay the amount due, would
you kindly inform him of the followings We do expect payment
in the next two weeks from two or three large contracts for
which we have received materials to complete, and we would
offer $5,500,00 by the 24th of August, approximately, with
the balance in three payments w1 thin ninety days. If this does
not satisfy the plaintiff, then we would ask your indulgence in
defending us to this end, as we can only perform to this extent",
Obviously considerable extra services were performed and requeste
by defendant after the payment of $455.00 on June 22, 1973.
properly

char~ed,

The $50 fee was

well earned, never paid and never objected to.

The defendant stated several times that he was able to and would
pay reasonable fees.

(R. 94, 105)and did not contest the additional Flint

a.Jil. Walling bill (R. 104, 105).

POINT
V provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
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ACCEPTABLE
A CONTINGENT FEE OF ONE-FOURTH IS ANmay

-11Contingent fee arrangements have long been an accepted and
are a very common method of applying attorney's fee,

In 4A Pacific Digest

2nd Sections 147, 148 (1) 148 (2) and 148 (3) several pages refer to
contingent fees and none of the many citations appeared critical of the
contingent fee but discussed various problems connected with its application,
A contingent fee contract was upheld in the following California
case when the court had to consider the circumstances surrounding the matter
to determine the parties intent,

Houge v, Ford, 285 P 2d 257.

"Contingent fee contract between attorney and client,
when explained by reference to circumstances under which it
was made and matter to which it relates, left no doubt as to
its meaning, and statute providing that any possible doubts as
to meaning of contract should be resolved against person
preparing it was not applicable,"
Priester v, Citizens Nat, Trust & Saving Bank 280 P 2d 835:
"Contract between attorney and client for the rendition
of services construed as a whole, manifested the intent that
one-fourth interest in all the properties described which
were all the properties belonging to plaintiff would be
the fee of the attorney if he were successful in defending
plaintiff in an action brought against him by his mother to
recover an apartment house,"
The Utah Case, Petrie v, General Contracting Co,, 17 U 2 408,
413 P 2d 600, involved a client's action against an attorney who claimed
a one-third interest in mining claims,

The Supreme Court upheld the lower

court in finding the client and attorney intended that the attorney was to
receive a contingent fee of one-third of whatever was obtained from
defendant,

The court further held that:
"There is no question about the validity of a contract
for an attorney's fee contingent upon recovery, which may
be a share of it; nor that the same rules apply to it as to
other contracts. Both the amount and the means of payment,
whether in money or property, depend upon the agreement between
the parties, In the event of uncertainty or ambiguity as to
their intent, it may be divined from their conduct and the
surrounding circumstances,"
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from

-12surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties.

Obviously in our

case judging from past practices and the fact that attorney's fees were
received based on twenty five percent over a nine month period without
objection shows an agreement of the defendant to the one-fourth fee as well
as an agreement on the reasonableness.

If the courts found one-third

reasonable in the above case certainly the arrangement between plaintiff
and defendant for one-fourth was reasonable,

The court goes on to observe

that a client has a duty to be honest with his attorney as well as the
lawyer to his client:
"In the circumstances here shown the fact that Mr. Tuft
was plaintiff's attorney in the prior action gives him no
less rights than any other associate would have had who had
been assigned one-third of "whatever was obtained from the
defendant." We are constantly hearing talk about the
obligations of lawyers to be honest with their clients, which
is correct and salutary. But it is also true that a client
has a duty to be honest with his lawyer and that the latter • s
rights are equally entitled to be safeguarded by the courts."
"We are in accord with the view of the trial court that
the reasonable deduction from the facts shown is that the
parties intended that Mr. Tuft was to receive a contingent fee
of one-third of whatever was obtained from the defendant,
whether money or property, •• ,",
Section 78-51-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, states:
"The compensation of an attorney and counselor for his
services is governed by agreement, express or implied, which
is not restrained by law. From the commencement of an
action or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon
his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to
a verdict, report, decision or judgement in his client's favor
and to the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come, and
cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before
or after judgement".
In the Utah Case, Bishop v, Parker, 103 Ut. 145, 134 P 2d 180,
the Court held that compensation is governed by agreement, express or implioo
and is not restrained by law.
The Jones v, rartin California Case, 256 P 2d 905 held that
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-13clients cause of action and a trust is created in the recovery for
benefit of the attorney and that:
"neither client nor opposite party, if latter has
knowledge of attorney's rights, can so compromise
litigated subject matter as to defeat attorney's rights."
In Rader v, Thrasher, California, 368 P2d 360 the Court
held a contingent fee contract may properly provide for larger compensation
than would otherwise be reasonable,
A 1962 California case Setzer v, Robinson, 368 P2d 124, held
as follows:
"Contingent fee agreement was not unconscionable
where it provided for fee of one-third of recovery, w1 th
retainer paid at outset credited upon such one-third, even though
defendant in case for which attorney was retained defaulted, in
view of fact that parties could not tell in advance that
default would occur and services might have included contested
trial and possible appeal,"
"Reasonableness of contingent fee is to be judged not
by hindsight but by situation as it appeared to parties at time
contract was entered into".
7 Am Jur 2nd

~

214 states:

"Contingent fee contracts between attorney and client are
recognized as valid unless obtained by fraud, mistake, undue
influence, or suppression of facts on the part of the attorney,
or unless the contract is contrary to public policy".
"§ 223 - The client cannot by settling, compromising, or
dismissing a pending suit or action, without consent or over
the objection of his attorney, deprive the attorney of compensation which the client agreed to pay."

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays the lower court be reversed and
Judgement be allowed for the plaintiff against the defendant,
Dated this 3rd day of January, 1977.
Respectfully Submitted

Keith E, Sohm
Suite 81 Trolley Square
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-14Mailed a copy to counsel for defendant, Roger F. Cutler,

602 East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah this 4th day of January, 1977.

Keith E. Sohm
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